In an ideal inclusive political system, all citizens are equally able to influence and challenge policies. We focus on how inclusiveness affects climate policies and outcomes. We argue that more inclusive systems should produce more policies in response to environmental threats and should have better outcomes. We test these hypotheses using panel and cross-sectional data relating to climate policy outputs and outcomes. The results suggest that inclusiveness is positively associated with policy outputs, but probably not with lower emissions of greenhouse gases. This pattern may relate to a lack of deliberation in systems, which are relatively inclusive in the narrower sense of pluralist theory.
Introduction
It is widely believed that the empowerment of environmentally concerned citizens is a necessary condition for achieving sustainability, and that further democratization is therefore a key to achieving better environmental policies and outcomes. Concern for democratic inclusiveness is built into important international statements on sustainability, such as Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which states that environmental issues are "best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level." 1 Here, we focus on whether an inclusive form of democracy, in which all citizens can participate in environmental decision-making, is important for environmental sustainability.
Robert Dahl distinguished between two main dimensions of democracy -inclusiveness
and contestation: 2 inclusiveness varies with "the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government;" 3 contestation requires that citizens "have unimpaired opportunities (1) to formulate their preferences, (2) to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action, [and] (3) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government." 4 Contestation and inclusiveness are positively correlated, but there is considerable variation on the inclusiveness dimension among countries with similar contestation scores. 5 We test the proposition that higher levels of democratic inclusiveness are associated with greater environmental policy outputs and better performance as measured by environmental outcomes. We focus on climate change because of its significance as an issue in environmental politics.
In the academic literature, the belief that democracies have a better environmental performance than autocracies often rests on ideas about inclusiveness. Liberal democracies allow environmentally aware citizens to channel their demands more effectively than in nondemocratic systems, because of higher levels of inclusiveness. 6 Unlike autocrats who can survive in power by paying off supporters from a relatively small "selectorate," democratic leaders must be more inclusive in the provision of benefits, which results in supplying public goods that benefit the electoral majority. 7 This argument should also apply to environmental public goods. 8 Some scholars argue that environmental sustainability necessarily presupposes democracy, because it demands widespread societal debate and engagement. 9 In building our theoretical argument about inclusiveness, we draw on the work of green democratic theorists who believe that new, deeper forms of democratic participation play a role in eliciting environmental awareness and, thus, increasing relevant policy output as well as improving environmental outcomes. 10 Using a single-dimensional, aggregate measure of liberal democracy such as the polity2 scale, 11 there is an extensive statistical literature on whether democracies have better environmental performance, ceteris paribus, than autocracies. 12 Democracies seem to be willing to take on more international environmental commitments, 13 but in relation to other aspects of performance, conclusions depend on the sample of countries, the time period examined, and the aspect of environmental performance considered. 14 So far, this literature is largely silent on the question of what dimension or dimensions of democracy matter most.
Some theorists have long advocated participatory, community-based alternatives to liberal democracy, 15 and some empirical studies in the environmental literature focus on themes related to inclusiveness such as civil society or stakeholder participation. 16 However, there is a need to look more broadly at inclusiveness as a wider societal phenomenon advocated by normative theories of democracy.
It is not our position that other aspects of democracy are irrelevant to sustainability. Rather, we focus on inclusiveness because a reasonable prima-facie case can be made for its importance, and because democratic theorists highlight it as a key aspect. However, we currently know little about its actual effects. First, we sketch the re-emergence of inclusiveness as a prominent theme in democratic theory. We establish the theoretical link 4 between inclusiveness and environmental outputs and outcomes. We then discuss aspects of inclusiveness, corresponding to inclusiveness in the pluralist sense that we think are significant and can be captured in a cross-national study. We find that inclusiveness in the pluralist sense leads to greater output of policy related to climate change, but this does not seem to translate into better policy outcomes at present.
In the conclusion, we suggest that one possible explanation of this is the failure to meet deliberative norms in systems that are inclusive in the narrower pluralist sense. We thus perceive this research as an important step forward in the research agenda on inclusiveness, deliberation, pluralism, and environmental policies and outcomes.
The re-emergence of inclusiveness
Post-World War II democratic theory emphasized Weber's and Schumpeter's elitist models of democracy, in which participation was -if anything -seen as heightening conflict, disruption, and fanaticism. 17 However, more recent democratic theory has revived the norms of inclusiveness and participation as part of the study of democracy as a normative ideal of government oriented to the common good, where "the normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes." 18 This concern for inclusiveness as part of the core of democracy is evident in the institutionally focused, empirically based theories of pluralism. 19 It has also been a key tenet of the resurgence of normative theory through the emergence of participatory 20 Similarly, deliberative democracy is first and foremost a normative theory of democratic legitimacy, 29 defining democratic legitimacy not by a specific set of representative institutions or electoral processes, but by all affected citizens' "participation in authentic deliberation" about the political decisions they are subject to. 30 As such, it goes beyond the earlier participatory theories by not only stipulating participation as such, but a demanding normative ideal of even deeper inclusiveness.
As pointed out above, the literature already highlights a range of reasons to link inclusiveness with sustainability. However, on the basis of these developments in democratic theory, we offer some further considerations.
Democratic inclusiveness and environmental sustainability
Most green theorists reject the existing liberal democratic model for its close connection with capitalism, its short-term orientation, and its distance from community engagement. While democratic theory has recently produced some new, largely small-scale alternatives, 31 we argue that a key variable to overcoming these limitations, and hence a key variable capturing the environmental significance of democratic participation, is inclusiveness. First, only on a larger scale will a sufficiently wide range of citizens, organizations, and institutions be encouraged to take a more pro-social, longer-term perspective through participation. 32 Moreover, only in conceptions of broad, system-wide inclusiveness as opposed to singular participatory innovations is there room for a range of ways of giving voice, because of the diversity of institutions or institutions allowing protest and other antagonistic voices. 33 Thus, we argue, the widely theorized promise of democratic participation for sustainability is most likely to be realized when democratic engagement is inclusive in a system-wide sense -which could therefore plausibly be one of the core features at work in the link between democratization and environmental policy-making.
The strongest case for excluding some citizens from environmental decision-making might be that their perceived interests would lead them to wish to block necessary changes. Yet, if people are excluded from the political process, they are less likely to see it as legitimate and to accept its output or outcomes. What is more, social capital is known to be particularly important to solving environmental problems, because it encourages reciprocity and prosocial behaviour. 34 Citizens who are excluded may come to distrust those who make decisions; and exclusion also prevents network relations between all members of the community from being built. Thus, exclusion is liable to reduce the amount of social capital, as it isolates some citizens. This would make it harder to motivate community-or societywide change.
Dealing with climate change in particular requires considerable changes in everyday behaviour that are hard for any state to monitor and to control (coercively) -if this should even be seen as desirable. Hence, the legitimacy that stems from inclusiveness is particularly important for dealing with this issue. Although less progress might be possible in the short term if an inclusive process brings in those opposed to change, in the long run, this seems necessary as processes regarded as illegitimate are likely only to bring about limited change.
For instance, while it is by no means the case that all sections of the business community oppose moderate forms of ecological modernisation, 35 some industries decisively oppose fundamental and necessary changes such as the rapid move to a low or no-carbon energy economy. This is true of some powerful oil, gas, and coal companies, for example. Wide participation counteracts the domination of powerful economic interests typical of liberal democracies by opening up room for a wider set of values and concerns, including otherregarding, generalizable interests and values to come to the fore. 36 Companies and sectors whose immediate interests lead them to wish to block change may be induced by concern for profitability to accept it if they see that most citizens are now persuaded, and participation might also induce changes in corporate norms and business ethics.
Similarly, some have made the case for environmental guardianship where citizens are excluded from key decisions made by scientific and technical elites who know what is best for the rest of society. 37 However, while scientific and technological expertise is important for dealing with environmental issues, they are far from being the only relevant forms of knowledge. Skills required to adapt everyday behaviour, to work together in local communities, to find ways of financing small investments, and to persuade others of the seriousness of the problem, are widely distributed in society. It is by no means the case that political or economic elites monopolize them. Citizen engagement and participation focus the political debate, bring together information, and provide opportunities for social learning, all of which can make environmental politics more effective and long-term in orientation. 38 Yet, what is often neglected is that only if these political processes are inclusive, so that citizens and stakeholders feel they can have a meaningful say, will it become worthwhile for them to develop relevant skills. 39 There is potential for a virtuous circle whereby inclusiveness generates better-quality debate while at the same time tying citizens together as members of a political community. This can be crucial in relation to typical problems of implementation between environmental policy outputs and outcomes. Policies may fail to have an impact because they are not implemented, perhaps because they were purely symbolic and meant to reassure the public. 40 If policy is arrived at after an inclusive debate that engages not only the wider public, but also organs of the state that have to develop detailed policies and to implement them, it is less likely that the state can just ignore what has gone on, 41 because the debate will create a public attentive to implementation failure of an extent not reached at a smaller scale or less deep forms of engagement.
Thus, we argue that it is not just democratic politics as such, but democratic inclusiveness that is centrally important to sustainability. Inasmuch as successful sustainability politics demands, as we have highlighted, deep, proactive citizen debate that includes critical voices and fosters social learning, the relevant form of inclusiveness goes beyond the sheer numerical weight of participation. Whilst pluralism is far from being a homogenous view of politics, 42 it tends to ignore the processes that lead citizens to hold the views they do, and to ask questions about how such processes should be seen from a normative perspective. 43 In this respect, we can contrast a "pluralist" focus on the numerical weight of participation with our idea that it is deeper, system-wide inclusive debate that holds the greatest promise for sustainability. We return to this point, in combination with deliberation, in the conclusion.
Comparing inclusiveness across countries
An important question about inclusiveness is who does and does not belong to the demos.
Arguably, all competent adults affected by decisions should be included. 44 Beyond this, however, our theory contributes the idea that a deep democratic form of inclusiveness is important. For the purpose of our study and in light of its role in recent democratic theory, we thus seek to capture the following aspects of inclusiveness. First, inclusiveness increases to the extent to which citizens have equal opportunity to express their views, if they so desire.
Standard individual citizenship rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, association, Third, individuals may be deterred from expressing opinions, because the probability that they will make a difference is rather small and there are costs for doing so. 46 If citizens do not express views because in effect they see this is pointless, we argue that they are excluded.
Ideally, a flourishing civil society includes mechanisms that make individual expression seem meaningful, as well as providing selective incentives to participate that offset costs. 47 Hence, we should capture how the strength of civil society varies cross-nationally.
We expect these three aspects of inclusiveness we have highlighted to be positively associated with policy outputs and with improved environmental outcomes.
Research design

Climate policy output -Dataset and variables
It may take a considerable time for policy outputs to translate into changes in outcomes, so we Our first measure relating to inclusiveness is PARCOMP, which captures on a five-point scale "the degree to which political participation is free from government control." 49 In countries obtaining the highest score of 5, " [t] here are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups.
Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption." 50 This measure, which we term inclusiveness-P, captures the importance of a competitive political process to inclusiveness.
Our second measure pertaining to inclusiveness comes from Coppedge et al. 51 who start with more than a dozen indicators of democracy and, in total, up to 19 sub-dimensions of democracy, and then carry out a principal components analysis. The first component relates to inclusiveness because it captures political freedoms, the sub-dimensions of democracy that load most heavily on it being adult suffrage, the size of the "selectorate" that is important to maintaining regime stability, 52 elections, legislative and executive selection, women's political rights, Vanhanen's index of participation, and openness of executive recruitment. 53 We term this variable inclusiveness-C. It correlates highly and positively with inclusiveness-P (Pearson's r=0.626; p<0.01).
We use the average number of established ENGOs with an organizational structure registered in a country with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) between 1990 and 2006 to capture a flourishing civil society. The data for this variable, ENGO leverage, are taken from Bernauer et al. 54 We expect the direct effect of this variable to be positive, as environmentally concerned citizens are more likely to participate. 55 We also expect a positive, synergistic interaction between ENGO leverage and either of the two inclusiveness variables as higher scores on these should allow organised environmental groups to express themselves in debate. 56 We capture this using multiplicative interaction terms.
We additionally consider variables that have been identified by the previous literature as crucial determinants of environmental outputs. 57 We control for the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) a state is a member of, 58 
Climate policy outcome -Dataset and variables
Our outcome measure is CO 2 emission levels in metric tons per capita (log-transformed). The data for this variable vary over time and, thus, we use a time-series cross-sectional dataset.
After taking into account missing values of the explanatory variables, the panel data comprise 201 countries over the time period 1974 to 2000. 67 Given the longitudinal nature of these data, we include a temporally lagged dependent variable that captures a country's CO 2 emission level in the previous year, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The lagged dependent variable captures general time dependencies, while year fixed effects control for common temporal shocks. Finally, country fixed effects control for idiosyncratic path dependencies and other forms of cross-sectional heterogeneity.
The controls we include are annual observations of the same ones we include in models of climate output, but we exclude the CCI and oil, gas, and coal production as these are timeinvariant and, hence, incompatible with country fixed effects. We lag all controls by one year to address endogeneity concerns. __________ Table 1 __________ In Models 1-4, the coefficients on either inclusiveness-P or inclusiveness-C (respectively) are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level with positive coefficients, so we find support for our theoretical argument that inclusiveness increases policy output. 68 In Model 1 a one-unit increase of inclusiveness-P is associated with a 0.039-point increase in climate policy output, while in Model 2 a 0.047 increase is associated with a one-unit increase of inclusiveness-C. Given that climate policy output ranges between 0 and 1, the impact of either inclusiveness variable is very substantial.
Results
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__________ Figure 1 
__________
In Models 1 and 2 the assumption is that the effect of ENGO-leverage is not conditioned by inclusiveness. Here we see no significant effect from ENGO-leverage on policy output. In Models 3-4, where we assume an interactive effect, we find that the interaction terms are significant at the 10 percent level, but we note that their coefficients are negative; so inclusiveness actually decreases the impact of ENGO-leverage on output. The multiplicative specification is easier to appreciate in the graphical form depicted in Figure 1 , showing how the coefficient of ENGO leverage changes with the relevant inclusiveness variable. According to Model 3 and the top left-hand panel of Figure 1 , the significant and positive impact of ENGO leverage on environmental output declines as inclusiveness-P increases, becoming insignificant if inclusiveness-P is greater than about 3.5. The same qualitative pattern emerges in relation to inclusiveness-C in Model 4, as seen in the top right-hand panel of Figure 1 . These results suggest that civil-society organization increases policy output unless inclusiveness is relatively high; but they are inconsistent with the idea of positive synergy with the inclusiveness. Table 2 __________ Table 2 presents our results for the climate policy outcome measure, CO 2 emissions per capita (ln), specifications being similar to those in Table 1 . First, neither inclusiveness measure is significant in Models 5-8 and, hence, inclusiveness is unlikely to affect climate policy outcomes. 70 In Models 5 and 6 the assumption is that the impact of ENGO-leverage is not conditioned by inclusiveness. Here ENGO-leverage has a negative and significant impact on CO 2 emissions per capita (ln). A one-unit increase (i.e., one additional ENGO) is associated with 0.1 percent reduction in CO 2 emissions per capita. In Models 7 and 8 we assume, in contrast, that there is an interactive effect. The bottom panels in Figure 1 , refereeing to Model 7 and 8 respectively, suggest that the negative impact of ENGO-leverage may only be significant for moderate to high levels of inclusiveness.
While none of the controls in Table 1 reaches conventional levels of statistical significance; most of them do so in Table 2 . For instance, we find a (largely) significant U- Our statistical models address associations between variables, not causation. Moreover, the models in Table 1 rely on purely cross-section data, which does not allow for exploiting temporal variance. Nevertheless, we can reach some summary conclusions. It appears that inclusiveness, as measured by our indicators of liberal freedoms and a competitive political process, is associated with increased policy outputs, but does not significantly improve outcome performance. It could be argued that between the broad international commitments that enter our measure of policy output and reduced emissions of greenhouse gasses must come detailed legislation at the domestic level, for instance to encourage change in patterns of energy demand and supply. Initial exploration suggests that inclusiveness may positively influence domestic policy output, too. In the online appendix, we show that the output of renewable energy policy at this level is positively correlated with ENGO leverage and, in this case, there is a synergistic interaction between ENGO leverage and inclusiveness. As discussed above, our indicators capture systemic inclusiveness only from a pluralist perspective. We return to this point in the conclusion, as it may help explain why we get different results for output and outcomes.
ENGO leverage appears to increase policy output unless inclusiveness is high. In this case rather than a positive synergy between civil-society organization and our measures of inclusiveness, we actually observe a negative interaction, however. This apparently paradoxical patterns confirm what has been termed the democracy-civil society paradox: 71 the marginal impact of an organized environmental movement decreases with higher levels of democracy (in our case inclusiveness) as, for one thing, democratic systems tend to pursue better environmental policies anyway. We also find that ENGO-leverage may decrease emissions, but only at moderate to high levels of inclusiveness. Thus, the evidence for the impact of this aspect of inclusiveness is quite limited.
Conclusion
Our purpose in this paper has been two-fold. First, we developed the argument that inclusiveness plays a key role in the widely theorized importance of democracy for environmental sustainability. We contended that new forms of participatory democracy are indeed promising for better environmental policy, but that it is important that these processes are inclusive in a broader sense, so that citizens feel they can have their critical views taken into account when climate change policy is made, and are driven to adopt more pro-social
outlooks. Second, we tested whether inclusiveness impacts on climate change policy outputs and outcomes. Understood in a pluralist sense, inclusiveness is associated with more policy output, but it does not necessarily appear to be associated with lower emissions.
One explanation of our findings is that the impact of inclusiveness of policy output has not yet had time to show up in reductions in emissions. Although we cannot ignore this possibility, we do not find it fully convincing. It certainly takes time to implement policies, but there was considerable domestic action to initiate policies in some developed democracies even before the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, going back to policy debates in the late 1980s and the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992.
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Recall, however, that our inclusiveness measures are based on, and in the more limited sense associated with, pluralist theory. Currently, it is not possible in a cross-national comparative study to capture whether an inclusive system also has processes that respect key features of deliberation, as conceived in normative theory. We recognize that this is a limitation of our study, but there are still good reasons to assess the impact of inclusiveness:
as we saw, several arguments in the literature link it to sustainability; and if it is also true that the promise of deliberation is limited without inclusiveness, inclusiveness stands as a key focus.
Still, it follows that we simply could not capture deliberative inclusiveness at this point.
Deliberation is a particularly demanding process of public reasoning, in which the fair and equal setting induces citizens to look beyond their immediate self-interest to justify their preferences in terms that all can in principle accept. While self-interest may enjoin citizens to free-ride on the environmental commons, 73 after deliberation, they should be more orientated towards the public good of sustainability. Recent developments within democratic theory have motivated a large body of literature on the role played specifically by deliberative engagement in environmental governance, 74 and empirical studies of innovations such as deliberative polls and citizens' juries have provided some evidence for a positive effect of deliberation on environmentally relevant attitudes. 75 While much of this literature has focused on experimentation with small-scale artificial events known as "mini-publics," 76 more recently, the focus in the theory has shifted towards the concept of "deliberative systems," 77 stressing larger-scale interactions between multiple deliberative as well as non-deliberative social actors, sites, and processes. Systemic deliberation can be thought of as dynamic sets of interacting processes, institutions, actors, and venues at various scales that may not be fully deliberative in themselves, but nonetheless contribute to inclusive deliberative engagement at the level of the society as a whole. 78 For instance, a deliberative system might include mesolevel deliberative forums linking organised groups and the state, 79 but it could also incorporate oppositional movements and forums. Thus, the recent shift in interest towards systemic deliberation is in line with the centrality of inclusiveness, of a type going beyond mere formal pluralism, that we have stressed in this paper. That being said, given its abstract normative nature, its full demandingness cannot at this point be captured in a quantitative empirical study.
And yet, it is instructive to keep this normative-theoretical context in mind, as the degree of "deliberativeness" of a society's democratic inclusiveness could play a part in explaining the discrepancy between policy outputs and outcomes we have observed through our analysis.
If inclusiveness is high in the pluralist sense, but there is little critical, attitude-changing deliberation among citizens, it is possible that climate change policy output will not translate into a significant reduction of emissions. It is deliberative engagement in particular that should create a public attentive to, and critical of, policies that are largely of symbolic significance, having little or no impact -even if implemented. Many developed countries were able to meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol as a result of deindustrialization and changes in the fuel mix brought about purely because of market forces, rather than climate change policy leading to changed social practices. In any case, the direct impact of Kyoto on global average temperature is probably miniscule, although some see the agreement as opening up economic, technological, and political possibilities for more thoroughgoing action. It is quite unlikely that commitments entered into force under the Copenhagen Climate Accord of 2009 will prevent dangerous global average temperature increase. 80 Participation by ENGOs in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol had some influence on process and framing, but little influence on outcomes. 81 It hardly met deliberative norms, 82 and was hardly accompanied by a ferment of deliberation at domestic level. If, so far, there is a considerable element of political symbolism rather than substance in policy outputs on climate change, it may be because inclusiveness on its own is insufficient, whether at the international or domestic level, without deliberation. Until cross-nationally comparable measures of the degree to which politics is deliberative as well as inclusive are developed, it is not possible to tell whether this explanation is supported by evidence. However, by developing the theory of inclusiveness to include deliberation, we have opened up a potential explanation, which we feel is well-worth pursuing in future research.
